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The End of Panda Politics
state gift, given to then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
in 1980. Their successors, however, have required 
many years of detailed discussion at the highest le-
vels in order to address the many political conditions, 
the legal framework and the considerable sums of 
money involved. (This time the pandas are not a gift 
from China, but are being lent to Germany as part of 
a specially organized bilateral research project).  
The pandas are the warm and fuzzy part of German- 
Chinese relations. In other areas, the contact is be-
coming less pleasant, a development that Germany’s 
politicians and business community are observing 
with growing unease. For many years the relation-
ship was reciprocal: Germany’s innovative power 
and China’s modernization complemented each 
other perfectly. Now, however, there is a greater 
awareness of the economic and political competi-
tion between the two nations – and of the confl icts 
that could result.
Somewhere in the west of China, in the bamboo for-
ests of Sichuan Province, two pandas are being read-
ied for their journey to Germany. The animals are to 
accompany Chinese President Xi Jinping when he vi-
sits Berlin next year, serving as goodwill ambassadors 
in the city’s zoo. Everyone loves pandas: They are 
cute, vulnerable, peaceful and vegan. Policy makers 
in Beijing would like nothing more than if the world 
were to feel for the entire country the kind of sympa-
thy it accords China’s national animal. “Panda diplo-
macy” has therefore long been a part of the country’s 
soft-power portfolio.
Not only are the creatures highly symbolic, so are 
the arduous negotiations that have been preceding 
their dispatch. Germany’s fi rst pandas were simply a 
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to prepare for confl icts. Yet the instruments Germany has at its disposal for achieving 
its considerable interests have often been weak at best.
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German-Chinese Dialogue Mechanisms
 Source: own presentation
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Beijing has a right to do exactly that, but it is forcing 
Germany to reconsider its own interests and how it 
will pursue them.          
Three current issues illustrate the cracks which threat-
en to undermine the harmony that has previously been 
the hallmark of German-Chinese relations.
Example 1: Kuka
This summer the name Kuka became synonymous 
with the question of how welcome Chinese invest-
ment is in Germany. The robot manufacturer Kuka is 
considered a key player in Industry 4.0,  Germany’s 
strategic initiative to combine manufacturing and 
high-tech. Wanting to acquire the company, the Chi-
na-based Midea Group made Kuka’s shareholders an 
attractive off er, unleashing fears that the Chinese 
could gain access to Germany’s core know-how – and 
not just at Kuka, but also at fi rms such as Daimler and 
Siemens who use Kuka’s robots in their production lines. 
The German government went to work behind the 
scenes to assemble a consortium of German play-
ers who could make a counteroff er and ensure Kuka 
remained in German hands. The rumor was also 
spread that Berlin might hinder a foreign takeover by 
dragging out the approval process for years. Critics 
accused the government – and Economics Minis-
ter Sigmar Gabriel, in particular – of heading in the 
direction of protectionism, thereby chipping away 
at the cornerstone of Germany’s economic policy, 
namely support for free markets. Yet can Germany 
adhere to this principle when dealing with a major 
economic power that uses protectionist barriers to 
shield many of its own economic sectors?
Gabriel’s eff orts occasioned considerable displeasure 
in Beijing and ultimately failed at home because of 
the tactical disinterest exhibited by German industry 
and due to the country’s shareholding laws. The steps 
Midea will take as majority owner remain to be seen. 
Yet as China aggressively expands into world mar-
kets, there will be an ongoing discussion about the 
diff erence between engaging in protectionism and 
ensuring business locations remain viable, a discus-
sion that will undoubtedly feature – contentiously – 
in German-Chinese relations.
Diplomacy and well-functioning business partner-
ships demand that discord be avoided if at all poss-
ible – and for good reason. Yet when they are able to 
speak freely, Germany’s managers and politicians are 
now asking how much longer they can count on Ger-
man-Chinese relations remaining harmonious and 
how Germany should position itself vis-à-vis China 
in the future. Until now, the instruments available for 
serving Germany’s considerable interests have often 
been weak at best.
Special relationship with cracks
Germany still enjoys a special relationship with China. 
Each country plays a key role for the other politically 
and economically. No other European nation has more 
extensive ties to China. The two countries jointly orga-
nize more than 60 programs and events for promoting 
dialogue (see Figure 1). Their government consulta-
tions are the most prominent among them. As part of 
the consultations, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
traveled to Beijing in June, accompanied by six cabinet 
members and fi ve secretaries of state. Germany is the 
only country with which China regularly holds cabinet 
meetings at the highest level of government.
Economically the two countries are the most import-
ant trading partner each has on the other’s continent. 
Exports to the People’s Republic account for approx-
imately 2 percent of Germany’s gross domestic prod-
uct (see Figure 2). For many German corporations and 
midsized technology fi rms, China is a make-or-break 
market. More than 5,000 German companies are cur-
rently active in China and over 1,000 Chinese com-
panies are present in Germany. Chinese have been 
the largest cohort of foreign students at Germany’s 
institutions of higher education for many years (cur-
rently: some 23,000) and are thereby establishing a 
growing network of connections on both the personal 
and societal levels.
The political, economic and social ties are now so 
close that it is hard to imagine a fundamental up-
heaval in the countries’ relations because of any single
confl ict. Yet the more the relationship develops, the 
more complex it becomes. China is hardly a panda 
simply strolling likeably, vulnerably and peacefully
across the global stage. The country is defending its 
interests with growing constancy and insistence. 
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Although Germany’s policy makers and business 
community are happy not to be directly involved in 
the dispute, Berlin is being forced to watch from the 
sidelines as a confl ict smolders in East Asia, a confl ict 
that has the potential to destabilize one of the globe’s 
most important economic regions. At the same time, 
China’s outright rejection of the ruling in The Hague 
shows how diffi  cult it is to include the country in 
international governance mechanisms – something 
Germany has a fundamental interest in doing.
Scenarios for China’s development
The current discussions show not only where the po-
tential for tension exists in German-Chinese relations. 
At least as important as individual examples of discord 
is the general uncertainty surrounding the direction 
China’s development will take. For a long time – too 
long, from today’s perspective – Germany’s political
and business leaders acted on the assumption that 
the Chinese system would converge with the western 
model over the medium term. The trend toward a less 
regulated economy, stronger rule of law, an ongoing 
opening to the rest of the world and, to some extent, 
a lessening of political control seemed irreversible. 
Such assumptions were what allowed Europeans to 
assert that China could be recognized as having a mar-
ket economy within 15 years. They presumed it would 
happen as a matter of course.
Now, however, as the Xi Jinping era begins, that cer-
tainty has largely dissipated. China fi nds itself in a 
phase of structural upheaval instead, with the out-
come anything but certain. The degree to which Chi-
na does or does not succeed in transforming itself 
will also impact its relationship with Germany. 
In order to better access long-term strategies, the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Fraunhofer Institute 
for Systems and Innovation Research developed sev-
eral scenarios of how things could develop through 
the year 2030 1. From the German perspective, three 
scenarios seem equally troubling: 
 •  In the Status Quo scenario, China’s political and 
economic system remains largely stable. Accor-
ding to this scenario, China would continue to be 
Example 2: Market economy status
Similar concerns underlie the debate about whether 
China should be granted market economy status 
(MES), something Beijing is demanding the EU do 
as of this December. The Chinese are justifying the 
move based on the country’s 2001 accession agree-
ment to the World Trade Organization (WTO). If MES 
is awarded, it would be more diffi  cult for European 
companies to defend themselves against Chinese price 
dumping. The decision about granting MES is being 
made at EU level; Germany, however, has a major say 
in the matter. 
Policy makers in both Berlin and Brussels are frus-
trated that the various alternatives Europe can choose 
from are all unsatisfactory. On a substantive level, a 
broad consensus exists that China does not meet the 
requirements for MES. Businesses complain about 
conspicuous asymmetries in the competitive con-
ditions faced by foreign fi rms in China and Chinese 
companies in Europe – in terms of rule of law, for 
example, the awarding of contracts for public projects 
and the openness toward investment.
At the same time, Germany and other EU members 
must concede that, from a legal perspective, China 
has a number of solid arguments on its side. The risk 
must therefore be avoided of having China contest 
its case at the WTO. If they want to avoid a trade war 
with China, the Europeans will, for the most part, 
have to accommodate China’s request – and begin 
looking for new trade-protection mechanisms that 
do not violate WTO regulations.
Example 3: South China Sea
Although China is insisting on adherence to interna-
tional law when it comes to being given market econ-
omy status, it is more than willing to dismiss inter-
national jurisprudence when the issue is sovereign 
rights in the South China Sea. In July, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague rejected most of 
China’s claim to territory near the Philippines and 
Vietnam. Although China has signed the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, it refuses to accept the 
ruling. Thus, the confl ict with its neighbors and with 
the US, which maintains a military presence in the 
Pacifi c, threatens to escalate.
1  China 2030: Szenarien und Strategien für Deutschland (China 2030: Scenarios and Strategies for Germany).  Bertelsmann Stiftung, June 2016.
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Exports from and imports to the Federal Republic of Germany, 2015 
Source: German Federal Statistical Offi  ce (DEStatis) https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/
ForeignTrade/TradingPartners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
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Quelle: German Federal Bank, „Bestandserhebung über Direktinvestitionen“, April 2016
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organizations in the event they should become gener-
ally accepted. 
In the case of the AIIB, Germany decided to become a 
member, not least in order to exert infl uence on the 
bank’s development. The establishment of the AIIB 
is, however, a good example of how China is able to 
play western nations off  each other, since the United 
States tried until the last minute to prevent the new 
organization from being seen as a serious alternative 
to institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank.
Political alliances
As much as Berlin has benefi tted from and wants 
to maintain its special relationship with Beijing, it 
will not be able to count on receiving preferential 
treatment over the long term. In all of the scenari-
os examined, as a midsized power Germany would 
gain in coming years if Europe had a coordinated, 
eff ective foreign policy in place vis-à-vis the Peo-
ple’s Republic. There are many reasons why the EU’s 
existence should be safeguarded. China’s rise is one 
of them.
China’s development is changing the international 
power structure. In order to be heard within it and to 
secure its own interests, Germany would be well ad-
vised to seek new coalitions, for example with other 
Asian countries. This applies both if China’s global
political and economic infl uence increases, and if 
China becomes involved in international confronta-
tions. Forging new alliances is, however, not without 
its risks. China mistrustfully monitors where part-
nerships arise around the world which could off set 
its own increasing importance and which might be 
designed to contain it.
Promoting reform and upholding values
Germany has a strong interest in China’s remaining 
stable and having an eff ective government. Stabili-
ty and reforms, moreover, are mutually dependent: 
In the past, China’s stability was the prerequisite for 
the reforms successfully implemented in many areas. 
In the future, it will only be possible to maintain 
stability if additional reforms are carried out. There 
is no lack in China of ambitious, intelligent goals for 
revitalizing the country. Yet great uncertainty exists 
as to whether China is indeed on the right path to
achieve these goals – and quickly enough to keep pace 
with its growing problems.
a diffi  cult but relatively reliable partner for Ger-
man companies and policy makers.
 •  In the Chinese Dream scenario, China’s govern-
ment successfully implements its ambitious 
economic reforms. This would make the country 
more of an economic competitor for Germany, 
although it would continue to be a growth mar-
ket and stable political partner.
 •  In the Great Wall scenario, several of the current 
problems escalate, causing China to become iso-
lated, similar to what has happened with Putin’s 
Russia. German-Chinese relations would suff er, 
as would the German business community.
What all the scenarios have in common is that deal-
ing with China will become more of a challenge. An-
other commonality, however, is that Germany can 
benefi t from all of the coming developments if its 
business and political leaders respond appropriate-
ly and soon. Although it is not possible to formulate a 
concise strategy for dealing with China, several areas 
exist that will play a crucial role in determining how 
German-Chinese relations evolve. 
Focus areas for Germany’s China policy 
International governance
Regardless of how China develops, Germany has 
an interest in including the People’s Republic to a 
greater degree in international governance mech-
anisms so that Beijing can take on more respon-
sibility addressing global issues – in the G-20, for 
example, in diplomatic coalitions formed to over-
come current crises, or at the UN. China has publicly 
expressed the desire to become a leading power, yet 
it remains unclear to what extent it can take on this 
role within existing structures or wants to make use 
of its own parallel institutions. 
China is skeptical of the existing institutions for glo-
bal governance since it does not feel it is adequately 
represented in them. Parallel institutions such as the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) diminish 
the infl uence of traditional institutions. The degree to 
which Germany should participate in these Chinese 
initiatives is, diplomatically, a sensitive topic. On the 
one hand, Germany has an interest in maintaining 
and strengthening existing mechanisms. On the other 
hand, it does not want to be excluded from the new 
9 
Asia PolicyBrief | August 2016
“Made in Germany.” The country’s policy makers must 
make this possible by putting the relevant educational 
policy framework in place.
Should China succeed in becoming an innovation 
leader in the relevant industries, it would be a serious 
competitor for German fi rms and, at the same time, 
a business location that off ers many promising op-
portunities. If Germany’s businesses want to bene-
fi t from China’s innovative power and have access to 
its brightest and best, they must make their Chinese 
employees and research centers an integral part of 
their global development strategies.
First movers would have a considerable advantage 
here. Until now, however, few German companies 
have been confi dent enough to transfer their core 
knowledge to China, since such a step will only truly 
pay off  when a level playing fi eld exists in the Peo-
ple’s Republic, one that eff ectively protects intel-
lectual property rights and ensures open access to 
the country’s markets. This development can only 
be found in the scenarios that assume the greatest 
willingness on the part of China’s leaders to intro-
duce reforms.
Free trade and investment 
As a major exporter, Germany has a core interest in 
promoting free trade. China will remain an important 
sales market for its products. How the global trade 
regime develops will also determine the options 
Germany has for further reducing trade barriers. 
New breakthroughs seem unlikely within the frame-
work of the WTO. Germany should therefore aim to 
create additional European free trade agreements 
(FTAs) in order to prevent German exporters from 
being disadvantaged by other bilateral or regional 
FTAs. One possibility is a European-Chinese FTA, in 
particular one that also reduces non-tariff  barriers.
Chinese foreign investment is increasing and as long as 
the country prospers economically, this trend is like-
ly to continue. This activity stems, on the one hand, 
from the desire to profi tably invest foreign curren-
cy holdings, for example in real estate. On the other, 
it is part of a strategy to create global corporations 
based in China, for example through the acquisition 
of successful western companies. The latter goal, in 
particular, is not uncontroversial.
In the past Germany has supported China’s reform 
policies in many areas and it should continue doing 
so. However, this includes recognizing that China’s 
reformers are not only to be found among its politi-
cians. Human rights activists and critical journalists 
are regularly subjected to repressive measures; open-
ly supporting them is politically risky, since China’s 
government views this as interference in its inter-
nal aff airs. Conversely, not supporting them entails 
the risk of hindering reforms instead of promoting 
them. All of the scenarios that envision successful 
reform show that progress in this area is not possible
without better rule of law, a system of values that 
espouses freedom, and a lessening of restrictions on 
digital media.
Maintaining the balance between pursuing interests 
and upholding values is one of the toughest challenges 
Germany’s policy makers face in dealing with China. 
The German public expects the country’s leaders to 
actively defend western values such as democracy,
freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 
China’s government resists counsel off ered by western 
nations and sanctions countries that get too involved in 
its internal aff airs. Defending Germany’s values with-
out endangering its business or economic interests is 
a balancing act that the country’s diplomats will have 
to maintain in all of the scenarios likely to develop in 
coming years.
Innovation
Regardless of how China develops, the competition 
to remain a leading innovator will be a key factor 
determining Germany’s future prospects. Germa-
ny’s economic strength stems from the innovative 
power of its businesses. For the most part, Germa-
ny alone will decide if it retains this competitive 
edge. The competition, however, is growing. China 
is investing enormous sums of money to catch up 
with the world’s innovators, especially in sectors in 
which Germany has traditionally excelled, such as 
mechanical engineering, renewable energies and hy-
brid vehicles.
This plan has only been partially successful until 
now, although China has become a global leader in 
a number of industries such as telecommunications 
technology and high-speed trains. In any event, 
the new competition is forcing German industry to 
develop more products faster and better in order to 
maintain the innovative advantage of off ering goods 
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How great the political and economic resistance will 
be in the future depends largely on how positively 
or negatively China is perceived on the international 
stage. Germany, however, has a fundamental inter-
est in attracting Chinese capital. It can increase its 
appeal by reducing bureaucracy and doing more to 
market itself as an advantageous business location.
Conclusion
China and Germany are key partners for each other. 
Their economic, political and social ties are closer
than ever before. This is a welcome development, 
since Germany and China need each other: as mar-
kets and fair competitors, as political allies working 
to address global challenges, and as sources of so-
cial inspiration.
The closer connection means, however, that never 
before has so much been at stake. The German and 
Chinese economies no longer simply complement 
each other, but are increasingly becoming rivals as 
well. That is a natural development. Confl icting in-
terests in the political sphere must also be expect-
ed. At the same time, both Germany and China face 
enormous pressure to implement reform. The stress 
this is producing in each of their systems is also 
being felt in their bilateral relations.
It is not advisable to create confl icts unnecessarily. 
At the same time, they should not be ignored. Germa-
ny should prepare itself for disputes with China that 
are more diffi  cult than those of the past. Until now the 
two countries have had little experience dealing with 
such situations. The challenge will be to create struc-
tures that make it possible to endure these confl icts 
and prevent them from spilling over into other areas. 
This will require Germany to become more aware of 
its own interests and to develop instruments capable
of achieving them. That might be painful, since it 
could disrupt what has previously been a harmonious 
relationship. It will also require recognizing that Ger-
many’s possibilities for taking action vis-à-vis China 
are often limited. But after all, German-Chinese rela-
tions involve much more than just pandas frolicking 
in a zoo.
The author is grateful to Fabienne Frauendorfer for her 
research assistance.
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Further reading:
China 2030: Szenarien und Strategien für Deutschland. Bertelsmann Stiftung, June 2016 (in German).
The Bertelsmann Stiftung has made an online tool available in conjunction with this study. It allows users to compare their own 
expectations of how China will develop with those of the experts: https://china-szenarien.bertelsmann-stiftung.de.
More than a Market – How German companies are growing roots in Chinese society. Bertelsmann Stiftung, May 2016. 
Link: https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/more-than-a-market/. 
What Economic Slowdown? Asia looks at China. Asia Policy Brief by Jabin T. Jacob. Bertelsmann Stiftung, April 2016. 
Link: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/-a862681310/.
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